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Comment
Not on Our Shelves: A First
Amendment Analysis of Library
Censorship in the Public Schools
I. INTRODUCTION
The vast variety of literature and other reading material sold in
this country indicates the diversity of taste characteristic of the
American reading public. This diversity often engenders conflict-
ing views concerning the quality of certain literary works and the
merit of reading them. When the readers are students at the sec-
ondary school level and the decisions concerning the literature to
which those students should be exposed are being made by school
officials, the potential for conflict may be intensified. The school
officials' determinations of the quality and value of certain works
may or may not mirror the views of the students or their parents.
Not surprisingly, litigation has sprung from this fertile source of
potential conflict.
Since the United States Supreme Court's historic decision in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District' in
1969, significant student rights litigation has occurred. This litiga-
tion has included cases in which varying tastes in literature have
played a central role. In these cases, which can for convenience be
labeled the "library censorship" cases, 2 student plaintiffs have
challenged public school officials' decisions to remove certain
books from the schools' libraries or curricula or both.3 Such chal-
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For a discussion of Tinker, see notes 56-73 & accompany-
ing text infra.
2. The cases dealing with removals of books from libraries and/or curricula of
secondary public schools have, for purposes of this Comment, been labeled
the library censorship cases.
3. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1980); Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3265 (1981) (No. 80-2043); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School
Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist.,
541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School
Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Salvail v.
Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
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lenges have rested on the theory that the officials' decisions vio-
lated the students' first and fourteenth amendment 4 rights. The
student plaintiffs have been successful in some cases,5 but in
others, the courts have found no first amendment issues or viola-
tions of any magnitude.
6
This Comment will analyze the library censorship cases, focus-
ing on the inherent conflict in book removal litigation between the
traditional authority of the public school administration to control
school operations and the first amendment rights asserted by stu-
dents.7 Now that the United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in a book removal case,8 a definitive resolution of the
conflict may be imminent.
4. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The first amendment is made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, which reads, in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W.
3265 (1981) (No. 80-2043); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d
577 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.I-.
1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D.
Mass. 1978). For a full discussion of these cases, see notes 141-90, 207-23 &
accompanying text infra.
6. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1980); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir.
1980); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d
289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). For a full discussion of these
cases, see notes 191-204, 224-51 & accompanying text infra.
7. The scope of this Comment is restricted to the issues presented by book re-
moval cases involving public schools at the secondary level. No attempt is
made to discuss the probable or desirable results of such a conflict at the
collegiate level. Courts and commentators have agreed that factors such as
college students' age and increased maturity in comparison to high school
students militate in favor of more expansive first amendment protection for
college students and, accordingly, less judicial tolerance of university offi-
cials' acts tending to infringe upon college students' first amendment guaran-
tees. See, e.g., Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973);
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 n.5 (2d Cir. 1971); Wright,
The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L REV. 1027, 1052-53 (1969).
8. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W.
3265 (1981) (No. 80-2043).
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II. TRADITIONAL CONTROL OF SCHOOL OPERATIONS
Unquestionably, schools play a vital role in helping individuals
develop capacities for thinking and analysis.9 Education, besides
awakening the student to cultural and societal values, aids the
child in adjusting to his environment.' 0 While the student must
remain free to inquire if his educational experience is to be truly
fruitful," it is generally thought that the first amendment guaran-
tee of free speech cannot be viewed as an absolute in the secon-
dary school environment if these schools are to operate
effectively.' 2 The potential conflict between the students' interests
in first amendment expression and inquiry and the school officials'
authority to control school operations and maintain discipline lies
at the heart of the library censorship cases. Consequently, some
background discussion of the judicial attitude toward the authority
of school officials and the emerging constitutional freedoms of sec-
ondary school students is essential.
A. Power of Boards of Education
A conventional basis for respecting the discretion exercised by
local boards of education and school officials in determining how to
manage public schools has been the in loco parentis doctrine. 3
The term "in loco parentis" has been said to mean "[i] n the place
of a parent; instead of a parent; charged factitiously, with a par-
ent's rights, duties, and responsibilities."' 4 However, the inflexibil-
ity of this doctrine has undermined its usefulness as a legitimate,
modern-day basis for actions of boards of education and school of-
ficials which affect students.15
A theoretical basis more commonly relied upon today for re-
specting decisions of school officials is the view that public schools
serve an indoctrinative function:' 6 they instill in students basic
9. James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
10. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1954).
11. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
12. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969); Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
13. Freeman, Trends, Conflicts, and Implications in Student Rights, in ScHooL-
iNG AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 186 (V. Haubrich & M. Apple eds. 1975).
14. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 896 (4th ed. 1968).
15. Freeman, supra note 13, at 186.
16. Note, First Amendment-Free Speeck Right to Know-Limit of School
Board's Discretion in Curricular Choice-Public School Library as Market-
place of Ideas, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1034, 1040 (1977).
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concepts, skills, knowledge, and values which the community con-
siders important.' 7 This indoctrinative function can be termed the
prescriptive model of education, which stands in contrast to the
analytic model of education:
In the prescriptive model, information and accepted truths are furnished
to a theoretically passive, absorbent student. The teacher's role is to con-
vey these truths rather than to create new wisdom. Both teacher and stu-
dent appear almost as automatons. Analytic education, however, signifies
the examination of data and values in a way that involves the student and
teacher as active participants in the search for truth. While these polar
models represent only a theoretical paradigm that can never exist in pure
form, we have traditionally conceived of pre-college public education as
essentially prescriptive, and college and post-graduate studies as
analytic.18
Because of this indoctrinative function of education, some curtail-
ment of students' first amendment rights of expression and inquiry
is inherent in public school systems.19
The states have granted local boards of education almost exclu-
sive control over public education.20 The boards are afforded
broad discretion with respect to school operations, especially in
the areas of classroom standards, student and teacher conduct,
and curricula.21 Under ordinary circumstances, the public school
administration has ultimate control over curriculum, the manner
in which subject matter is to be presented, and the materials to be
used in the teaching process.22 By statute, most states include
book selection as one of the powers of the local boards.23
While the broad discretion afforded local boards of education is
generally respected.by the judiciary,24 it would seem unsound to
17. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to De-
ternine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1976); Sartorius, So-
cial-Psychological Concepts and the Rights of Children, in SCHOOLING AND
THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 83 (V. Haubrich & M. Apple eds. 1975).
18. Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118
U. PA. L. REV. 612, 614 (1970).
19. Note, supra note 16, at 1040.
20. Niccolai, The Right to Read and School Library Censorship, 10 J.L & EDuc. 23
(1981).
21. Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 634 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); Schauer, School Books, Lesson Plans, and the Con-
stitution, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 287, 305-06 (1976).
22. Schauer, supra note 21, at 305-06.
23. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-4,118 (Reissue 1976). The breadth of this stat-
ute is typical of most state statutes dealing with the subject. The Nebraska
statute provides: "School boards and boards of education of all classes shall
purchase all textbooks, equipment, and supplies necessary for the schools of
such district." Id.
24. Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 631 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
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suggest that the discretion in the areas of book selection and re-
moval may be exercised wholly without regard to the constitu-
tional safeguards which protect students.25 Although some courts
view a local board's power to select books as implicitly accompa-
nied by the power to remove from use undesirable books and
materials,26 there is debate as to whether the discretion to remove
books may be exercised independently of students' first amend-
ment rights. 2 7 However, even when the actions of school officials
infringe upon the first amendment freedoms of students, courts
generally place great weight on the officials' decisions and are
predisposed, though clearly not irrevocably so, to uphold their ac-
tions.28 Only the view that the judiciary must remain "profoundly
skeptical" of any state assertion that an action significantly affect-
ing first amendment rights can withstand constitutional scrutiny29
keeps courts from deferring entirely to the judgment of school
officials.
Courts view the decisions of school officials after the fact,30 and
judges do not possess the educational expertise which school offi-
cials are presumed to have;31 thus courts are hesitant to intervene
in the management of day-to-day school affairs. 32 Nevertheless,
where fundamental constitutional guarantees are implicated,
courts will intervene to remedy past violations and to prevent fur-
ther violations of those guarantees. 33 Courts are sensitive to the
constitutional problems created when school boards, perhaps
under the guise of concern for students' welfare, allow community
prejudices to override the expression of contrary viewpoints in the
25. Schauer, supra note 21, at 306. See notes 143-63 & accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 201-04 & accompanying text infra.
27. See notes 141-253 & accompanying text infra. See also Eisner v. Stamford Bd.
of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the Second Circuit held that a
policy requiring school officials' approval before students could distribute a
publication on campus was not automatically unconstitutional. Id. at 805.
However, in this particular case the court struck down the policy statement
at issue as constitutionally deficient. Id. at 810-11. Employing language
which arguably would support school officials' power to remove undesirable
books and other materials, the court stated that the school administration
"has authority to minimize or eliminate influences that would dilute or dis-
rupt the effectiveness of the educational process as the state conceives it."
Id. at 807.
28. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
29. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1081 (1980).
30. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
31. Schauer, supra note 21, at 314.
32. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Hernandez v. Hanson,
430 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (D. Neb. 1977).
33. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Hernandez v. Hanson, 430 F.
Supp. 1154, 1156 (D. Neb. 1977). See Schauer, supra note 21, at 314.
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schools,3 4 or when the freedom of inquiry is unduly stifled.35 The
boards, through the exercise of their discretionary powers, may
not, as Justice Jackson put it, "strangle" the independent thinking
of students:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the
citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Educa-
tion not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly
discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizen-
ship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.
3 6
B. Parental Challenges to Local Board Control of School Operations
While the great tide of student plaintiff cases has occurred
since the 1969 Tinker decision, there were much earlier parental
challenges to the authority of boards of education and school offi-
cials to control school operations as they saw fit. In the 1923 case of
Meyer v. Nebraska,37 the Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska
statute which prohibited both teaching a subject in a foreign lan-
guage and teaching a foreign language to students below the
eighth-grade level. The Court held that the statute unconstitution-
ally deprived parents of a liberty interest in raising their children
and directing their education.3 8
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters3 9 the Supreme
Court held that the same liberty interest was impermissibly in-
fringed by an Oregon law which provided that no child between
the ages of eight and sixteen could attend a private school.40
34. James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
35. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), in which the Supreme
Court, in extolling the virtues of academic freedom, noted that "[s]cholarship
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and stu-
dents must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die." Id. at 250.
36. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). In Bar-
nette, the Supreme Court struck down a state board of education regulation
requiring students to salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance. Id. at
642.
37. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
38. Id. at 400-01.
39. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
40. Id. at 534-35. While the Court recognized and gave effect to the liberty inter-
ests of parents, the case actually was brought by the Society of Sisters, which
alleged that its business and property-the private school which it oper-
ated-were being injured and threatened with destruction by the state's in-
terference with the parents' rights. Id. at 535.
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More recently, parents successfully challenged an aspect of
state regulation of education in Wisconsin v. Yoder.41 In an opin-
ion authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held unconstitu-
tional the application of Wisconsin's compulsory school
attendance law to certain Amish chidren. Enforcement of the law
would have required all school-age children to attend school until
the age of sixteen, against the wishes of Amish parents who de-
sired to send their children to school only through the eighth
grade. The Chief Justice opined that enforcement of the law would
"gravely endanger if not destroy" the Amish's first amendment
right of free exercise of religion.42
The success parents have enjoyed in cases such as Meyer,
Pierce, and Yoder generally has not carried over to parental chal-
lenges of local school board control of curriculum content. The dis-
cretion vested in local school officials has been said to control in
that area.43 Nor have parental challenges to local school districts'
selections of books been successful. Courts generally accord
school officials a relatively free hand in selecting books.44 In one
notable challenge of a board of education's book selection, a parent
sought to remove Dickens' Oliver Twist and Shakespeare's The
Merchant of Venice from use in the New York City public
schools. 45 The parent alleged that the works were objectionable
because they kindled hatred of Jewish persons. 6 The court held
that the board of education had not abused its discretion in select-
ing the works, and thus their use could not be suppressed.47 The
court reasoned that school officials must be free to foster free in-
quiry and learning, and that public education, coupled with in-
struction in the home, would do much more to remove religious
and racial intolerance than would suppression of the literature.48
Absent facts demonstrating that "a book ha[d] been maliciously
written for the apparent purpose of promoting and fomenting a
bigoted and intolerant hatred against a particular racial or reli-
41. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42. Id. at 219.
43. See, e.g., Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), affid
per curiam, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970), in which it
was held that parents possessed no constitutional right which gave them ex-
clusive control over teaching their children about sexual matters and no con-
stitutional right which would prohibit sex education in the schools. Id. at 342.
44. T. vAN GEEL, AuTORITY TO CONTROL THE SCHOOL PROGRAM 147-48 (1976). It
is not clear whether student challenges in this area would meet with any
more success. See notes 263-72 & accompanying text infra.
45. Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344, 345 (Sup. Ct.
1949).
46. Id. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
47. Id. at 544, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
48. Id. at 543-44, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
[Vol. 61:98
LIBRARY CENSORSHIP
gious group,"4 9 the court found that the public interest could not
tolerate the suppression sought by the plaintiff.
Parents have been similarly unsuccessful in challenging book
selections on the grounds that school board decisions to use cer-
tain books violated their right to privacy,5 0 constituted an estab-
lishment of religion,51 and tortiously inflicted injury on them.52
Occasionally, however, parental challenges based on the content of
49. Id. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
50. Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (D. W.Va.), affd mer., 530 F.2d 972
(4th Cir. 1975). In Williars, summary judgment was granted against the par-
ent plaintiffs who alleged that certain of the board of education's book ap-
proval decisions constituted an establishment of religion, inhibited their free
exercise of religion, and violated their right of privacy. 388 F. Supp. at 96. The
court observed that while some of the books and materials selected were of-
fensive to the parents' beliefs, there clearly were no constitutional violations
of the sort claimed. Id.
51. Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90
(1975). Todd involved a parent's challenge to the board's approval of the Kurt
Vonnegut novel, Slaughterhouse Five. The parent's petition, which sought
mandamus to force removal of the book from use in the school, alleged that
Slaughterhouse Five "'contains and makes reference to religious matters"'
and that its use in the public schools therefore violated the first amendment.
Id. at 323-24, 200 N.W.2d at 91. The Michigan Court of Appeals indicated that
summary judgment should have been granted to the defendant board and
reversed the trial court's granting of a writ of mandamus to remove the book
from use in the public school curriculum. Id. at 328, 200 N.W.2d at 93.
The court of appeals noted that there simply was no authority for the
proposition that the establishment clause of the first amendment was vio-
lated merely because religion was referred to in literature used in a public
school system. Id. at 328-29, 200 N.W.2d at 93. Disturbed because the trial
judge apparently let his low personal opinion of the quality of Slaughterhouse
Five preempt the principled constitutional adjudication he should have
made, the court of appeals observed that the Constitution "Will tolerate no
supreme censor nor allow any man to superimpose his judgment on that of
others so that the latter are denied the freedom to decide and choose for
themselves." Id. at 338, 200 N.W.2d at 98. Further, the court stressed that
"[g]overnment has no legitimate interest in controlling or tabulating the
human mind nor the fuel that feeds it." Id. at 336, 200 N.W.2d at 97. Such
sweeping language seemingly could be relied upon by student plaintiffs in
challenges of school boards' book selection or removal decisions.
52. Carroll v. Lucas, 39 Ohio Misc. 5, 313 N.E.2d 864 (1974). In Carroll, an eighth
grade student's parents sought damages from school officials for a tort which
allegedly caused emotional distress to the daughter and the parents' loss of
the daughter's companionship. Id. at 9, 313 N.E.2d at 866-67. The alleged tor-
tious act was a school music teacher's assigning a book which the parents
objected to, causing the daughter to be exposed prematurely to matters from
which the parents had tried to protect her. According to the plaintiffs, the
book at issue, Trips: Rock Life in the Sixties, by Ellen Sander, included vul-
garity and approvingly portrayed promiscuous sexual activity. Id. at 6, 313
N.E.2d at 866. The court held there could be no recovery for the parents. Id.
at 9, 313 N.E.2d at 866-67.
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
books selected by the school board succeed.
53
Unsuccessful challenges in the courts, however, do not mean
that the views of parents are disregarded by school boards when
deciding whether to approve the use of certain books. It would be
naive to assume that school officials, whether elected or appointed,
are not sensitive to the views and preferences of the students' par-
ents.54 There have been numerous instances in which school offi-
cials have banned the use of certain books in their school systems
without court challenge,55 making it difficult to assess the effect of
parental pressure.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF STUDENTS'
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. The Tinker Legacy and its Relevance to Library Censorship Cases
No discussion dealing with students' constitutional rights
53. In Grosser v. Woollett, 45 Ohio Misc. 15, 341 N.E.2d 356 (1974), the plaintiffs,
both parents and students, obtained an injunction against the use of Claude
Brown's Manchild in the Promised Land and Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the
Cuckoo's Nest in the local school system. Id. at 16-17, 31, 341 N.E.2d at 359,
367-68. The court found that the injunction was warranted because use of the
works would have violated the Ohio statute dealing with the distribution of
harmful material to minors. In accordance with provisions in the statute, the
court did not ban outright the use of the books, but issued an injunction
prohibiting their use by individual students unless the students' parents
knew of the character of the books and consented to their children's use of
them. The court stated that the statute was in accordance with existing
United States Supreme Court pronouncements on obscenity. Id. at 27-28, 341
N.E.2d at 365. Taking an unenlightened view, the court stated that both
Manchild and Cuckoo's Nest "have no literary, artistic, political or scientific
value whatsoever," id. at 30, 341 N.E.2d at 367, and that "the books were
designed by the authors to appeal to the base instincts of persons and to
shock others for the purpose of effectuating sales of the books." Id. at 30-31,
341 N.E.2d at 367. The Grosser decision is a departure from the results gener-
ally reached in cases involving parental challenges of school officials' book
selections, but that apparently can be attributed to the trial judge's inexplica-
ble impressions of the content of the literature at issue in the case.
54. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1081 (1980), and James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), in which the court expressed concern about
school officials who attempt to win community approval by making decisions
impinging upon the first amendment rights of students.
55. Among the works which have at one time or another been banned from use in
public school systems are: William Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice,
Samuel Clemens' Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn, Ernest Hemingway's
The Sun Also Rises (in one school system in 1960, all works by Hemingway
were removed from use), J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye, John Griffin's
Black Like Me, and Howard Fast's Citizen Tom Paine. A. HAIGHT, BANNED
BooKs 22, 57, 89-90, 99, 101, 102 (3d ed. 1970).
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would be complete without some treatment of the landmark case
of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.
56
In its narrowest sense, the decision held that public school stu-
dents peacefully wearing black arm bands as a vehicle for protest
were expressing themselves in a constitutionally protected man-
ner.5 7 Viewed in a broader sense, Tinker established that students
have significant first amendment rights which are not merely to be
"grudgingly tolerated," and that the first amendment is of funda-
mental importance to American education.5 8 With the statements
that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"59 and that school
officials must exercise their control over school operations in a
manner "consistent with fundamental constitutional safe-
guards,"60 Tinker set off a flurry of student rights litigation. This
litigation may be parceled into the principal areas of hair length
cases, 61 student suspension cases, 62 control over student newspa-
per cases,63 and library censorship cases.64
What came to be known as the Tinker test was formulated.
Under the test, student expression is protected and cannot be pro-
hibited unless it "materially disrupts classwork or involves sub-
stantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."65 The test can
be met by a showing of either actual disruption or disorder, or
"facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to fore-
56. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
57. Id. at 509.
58. A. LEVINE, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS: THE BASIc ACLU GUIDE TO A STUDENT'S
RIGHTS 25 (1973).
59. 393 U.S. at 506.
60. Id. at 507.
61. The hair length cases, which flourished in the early 1970's, produced a split
between courts which found that students had a constitutionally protected
interest and those which saw no constitutional issue. For a discussion of this
split, see J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 96-
108 (1974); A. LEVINE, supra note 58, at 47-48.
62. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the leading case dealing with due
process aspects of student suspensions.
63. Since the Tinker decision, the most significant cases dealing with students'
first amendment rights have involved student newspapers, both officially rec-
ognized school publications and those of the "underground" variety. The
newspaper cases collectively seem to have worked an accomodation between
the students' interests in expression and the school officials' interests in
maintaining order within the school For discussions of the newspaper cases,
see A. LEvINE, supra note 58, at 31-32, 34-41; Letwin, Regulation of Under-
ground Newspapers on Public School Campuses in California, 22 UCLA L.
REV. 141 (1974); Note, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: Protecting the Off-Cam-
pus First Amendment Freedoms of Students, 59 NEB. L. REv. 790 (1980).
64. See notes 141-251 & accompanying text infra.
65. 393 U.S. at 513.
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cast substantial disruption of or material interference" 66 with
school operations. The Tinker test is not particularly relevant in
the library censorship context, because such cases generally hinge
upon the student's purported first amendment right to know or re-
ceive information.67 In the exercise of this right, the receiver often
plays only a passive role rather than an active one. The Tinker test
appears more applicable to cases in which active instances of ex-
pression are sought to be suppressed.68
The chief value of Tinker for student plaintiffs in book removal
cases is the Court's recognition that students possess first amend-
ment rights which cannot be curtailed merely because school offi-
cials deem it desirable to do S0.69 Of additional value is the Court's
broad admonition that school officials' desires to avoid "the dis-
comfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint" 70 or "urgent wish[es] to avoid... controversy"71 are
66. Id. at 514. Most cases in which the Tinker test has been employed have fo-
cused on the "material and substantial disruption" portion of the test. See
Note, supra note 63, at 796-98.
The "interference with the rights of others" portion of the Tinker test was
resurrected in a 1977 Second Circuit case, Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). In that case, school officials
denied student newspaper staff members permission to distribute a ques-
tionnaire surveying the sexual attitudes, knowledge, experience, and prefer-
ences of ninth through twelfth grade students. Id. at 514-15. The staff
members intended to publish the results of the survey in the school newspa-
per. Id. The court found no constitutional defect in the denial of permission
to distribute the questionnaire because school officials reasonably could have
believed that the questionnaire could cause significant emotional harm to
some students. Id. at 519-20. In stating that "[t]he First Amendment right to
express one's views does not include the right to importune others to respond
to questions when there is reason to believe that such importuning may re-
suit in harmful consequences," id., the court apparently was relying upon the
"interference with the rights of others" portion of the Tinker test.
The Trachtman decision has been roundly criticized by commentators
who call it an example of undue deference to school officials. See, e.g., Dia-
mond, Interference With the Rights of Others: Authority to Restrict Students'
First Amendment Rights, 8 J.L & EDUC. 347,355-56 (1979). However question-
able the wisdom of Trachtman, it would seem that school officials who are
defendants in library censorship cases might want to assert the kind of ra-
tionale recognized in Trachtman as justification for the removal of certain
books from use in the school.
67. See notes 110-85 & accompanying text infra.
68. While the literal formulation of the Tinker test may not be appropriate in the
library censorship cases, other language in Tinker suggests that in such
cases, the board of education, to justify book removal, must demonstrate
some state interest which is at least as substantial as the particular "material
and substantial" interests referred to in the Tinker test. See notes 70-73 &
accompanying text infra.
69. See notes 58-60 & accompanying text supra.
70. 393 U.S. at 509.
71. Id. at 510.
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not sufficient to justify curtailment of students' first amendment
rights. Such desires may well be at the heart of many decisions by
school officials to remove certain books from use in the school sys-
tem. Offering a further statement relevant to library censorship
cases, Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, observed that "stu-
dents may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate."72 Student plaintiffs in
book removal cases thus may argue that students are in danger of
becoming just what the Court was concerned about if school offi-
cials are given sweeping latitude in book removal decisions.
School systems cannot, cautions Tinker, become "enclaves of
totalitarianism."7 3
These statements in Tinker are reminiscent of statements in
earlier Supreme Court cases which dealt with education and the
first amendment, but did not deal directly with students. In
Shelton v. Tucker,7 4 a 1960 case, the Court struck down an Arkan-
sas statute which required teachers to reveal every organization to
which they belonged or contributed within the preceding five
years, calling the statute overly broad75 and violative of the teach-
ers' freedom of association.76 Employing language expansive
enough to apply to students as well as teachers, Justice Stewart
stated that "[t] he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
77
Seven years later, the Court, in Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents,78 struck down a New York regulation designed to prevent
the appointment of subversive persons to positions of state em-
ployment, including teaching positions. The Court held that the
vagueness of the plan unconstitutionally chilled the exercise of
first amendment rights,79 that the plan was overly broad,SO and that
the plan infringed upon associational freedoms.81 As in Shelton,
the Court extolled the virtues of academic freedom82 and stated
that the first amendment "does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
72. Id. at 511.
73. Id.
74. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
75. Id. at 490.
76. Id. at 486-87.
77. Id. at 487.
78. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
79. Id. at 604.
80. Id. at 609.
81. Id. at 607.
82. "Academic freedom" can be defined as "the teacher's freedom from external
control in order to foster free discussion and interchange of ideas in an aca-
demic environment." Schauer, supra note 21, at 288-89. Under the right to
receive information theory advanced in the library censorship cases, see
notes 143-85 & accompanying text infra, the teacher's right to academic free-
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orthodoxy over the classroom." 83 Student plaintiffs in library cen-
sorship cases should be able to rely upon this principle and main-
tain that if such orthodoxy cannot constitutionally be prescribed
for the classroom, it cannot constitutionally be prescribed for the
library. The Court in Keyishian labeled the classroom "peculiarly
the 'marketplace of ideas,"' stating that "[t] he Nation's future de-
pends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selec-
tion.' "84 The same marketplace of ideas theory has been seized
upon by student plaintiffs in library censorship cases.
85
Both Shelton and Keyishian were cited in another pre-Tinker
decision which is sometimes regarded as supplying the test to be
applied in library censorship cases.8 6 In Epperson v. Arkansas,
87
the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of an Arkansas
statute which prohibited the teaching of evolution in public
schools and universities. 88 While the law was held unconstitu-
tional only on the narrow ground of establishment of religion, 89 the
opinion included portions which implicated the entire first amend-
ment. The Court formulated a test for determining when the judi-
ciary should intervene in the resolution of school conflicts:
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the
Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. Our courts, however,
have not failed to apply the First Amendment's mandate in our educa-
dom arguably could be deemed to engender a related right to receive infor-
mation on the part of the students.
83. 385 U.S. at 603.
84. Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943)).
85. See notes 162-64 & accompanying text infra.
86. See notes 206-32 & accompanying text infra. Perhaps the explanation for the
occasional reliance on the Epperson test in library censorship cases is that
Epperson was a case requiring the Court to determine whether to regulate
curriculum content, and curriculum is an area logically related to book
choice.
87. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
88. Id. at 103. The law constituted an establishment of religion because it deleted
from the curriculum a particular body of knowledge which purportedly con-
flicted with a particular religious doctrine.
89. See Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The
Scope of Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE LI REv. 1479 (1972), wherein the author
noted that Epperson, having been decided only on the narrow establishment
ground and not on the broader free speech ground which conceivably could
have been relied upon, did nothing to dispute the validity of the statement
that the Supreme Court has never disposed of a curriculum matter on a free
speech basis. Id. at 1504. It is important to remember that Meyer v. Ne-
braska, a case dealing with curriculum content, was decided not on a first
amendment basis, but on the basis of the parents' liberty interest under the
due process clause. See notes 37-38 & accompanying text supra.
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tional system where essential to safeguard the fundamental values of free-
dom of speech and inquiry and of belief. By and large, public education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.
Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which
arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly
and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.9 0
While Epperson reiterated the Court's apparent concern for the
preservation of the first amendment in schools, its test would re-
quire that the courts not overturn the decisions of school officials
unless those decisions "directly and sharply" infringe a first
amendment right.
B. The Scope and Extent of Students' Constitutional Rights
When read liberally, the cases discussed in the preceding sub-
section suggest that student rights are the virtual equivalents of
rights accorded adults. There are cases, however, which restrict
this apparently broad scope of student rights and which indicate
that interference with student rights will be tolerated to a much
greater extent than interference with the rights of adults.9 1 The
courts which assert that students' first amendment rights are not
coextensive with those of adults have seized upon a statement to
that effect by Justice Stewart in his concurrence in the Tinker
case 92 and other Supreme Court cases involving minors, but not
pertaining to the school environment.
In Ginsberg v. New York, 93 the Court upheld the conviction of a
merchant who sold certain magazines to a youth in violation of a
New York law prohibiting the sale of "harmful" materials to mi-
nors, even though the magazines would not have been regarded as
obscene with respect to adults.94 The Court observed that the stat-
ute did not invade an area of expression which the Constitution
90. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Following the enunciation of
this apparent test, the Court cited the Shelton and Keyishian language dis-
cussed earlier. Id. at 104-05. See text accompanying notes 78-84 supra.
91. See, e.g., Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1980) (while stu-
dents do not lose all first amendment rights at school, their first amendment
rights are not coextensive with those of adults); Baughman v. Freienmuth,
478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973) (same); Hernandez v. Hanson, 430 F. Supp.
1154, 1159 (D. Neb. 1977) (same). See also Garvey, Children and the First
Amendment, 57 TEX. L REV. 321 (1979), wherein the author stated: "[T]here
is no denying that the child's speech right is different in kind as well as de-
gree from the right of free speech possessed by adults." However, the author
further noted that the student does have a right to freedom of expression
which forms part of "the fundamentally just claim all children have against
the state-that it should respect and leave open the possibilities of choice
that they will have on reaching maturity." Id. at 339.
92. 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
93. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
94. Id. at 633-34.
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had secured for minors.95 It held that the state had the power to
regulate for the well-being of children and could constitutionally
prescribe different standards for obscenity as related to minors.
96
Thus under Ginsberg the broad scope of first amendment protec-
tion of the expression of adults may not extend to minors because
of the state's power to protect the well-being of minors.
The 1975 case of Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville97 renewed the
Ginsberg rationale, even though the Court struck down an ordi-
nance prohibiting drive-in theatre operators from exhibiting mov-
ies containing nudity. Unconstitutionality was based, in part, on
the ground that if the ordinance was intended to regulate expres-
sion accessible to minors, it was fatally overbroad.98 Justice Pow-
ell stated that, after Ginsberg, "[i]t is well-settled that a State or
municipality can adopt more stringent controls on communicative
materials available to youths than on those available to adults."99
The opinion stressed, however, that in view of cases such as
Tinker, "minors are entitled to a significant measure of First
Amendment protection,"'00 and that "only in relatively narrow and
well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemina-
tion of protected materials to them."101
The somewhat puzzling, often-criticized decision 0 2 in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation03 further indicates that minors may not en-
joy first amendment rights to the same extent as adults. The plu-
rality opinion by Justice Stevens upheld the FCC's authority to
impose sanctions on broadcasting stations airing broadcasts
which, although not obscene, contained "indecent" language.
04
The plurality expressed concern over the ready accessibility of
such language to children in the audience, and apparently author-
ized the withholding of some forms of offensive expression from
children.105
Courts have relied on the foregoing cases to determine that the
95. Id. at 637-38.
96. Id. at 638.
97. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
98. Id. at 213.
99. Id. at 212.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 213.
102. See, e.g., L. TamE, AamRicx CONSTTUTIONAL LAw 67-68 (Supp. 1979),
wherein Professor Tribe characterized the decision as an unfortunate one
and stated its rationale should be discarded before any significant imprint is
left on first amendment doctrine.
103. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The case stemmed from a radio station's playing, during
the afternoon, a recording of "Filthy Words," a comedy monologue by George
Carlim. Id. at 729.
104. Id. at 738.
105. Id. at 749.
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first amendment rights of students are not coextensive with those
of adults. Some commentators have regarded such a view as un-
wise. Stating that the essence of the first amendment is "the man-
date of free mind,"1 06 one commentator has stressed that if we are
to "develop the powers of independent thought rather than those
of the patient plowman or the diligent housewife," minors cannot
be excluded from the free discussion inherent in the adult
realm.10 7 It has been argued that secondary school students must
have the same first amendment rights as adults'0 8 and that Tinker
points the way to such a conclusion:
An enlightened decision like Tinker cannot alone do the job. If its promise
is to be realized, it must be accompanied by a refusal to tolerate any de-
nial of rights based merely on unadorned proclamations that children are
immature, in need of protection from themselves or from others, or simply
that they are "different."10 9
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE OR KNOW
One of the primary arguments relied upon by student plaintiffs
in the library censorship cases is that they have a first amendment
right-variously termed the right to receive information, the right
of access to information, the right to know, or the right to read-
which has been infringed by the school officials' removal of certain
books from use in the school system." 0 This asserted right has as
its theoretical basis a string of United States Supreme Court cases
which dealt with the right to receive information. Although these
cases did not involve student plaintiffs, some discussion of them is
necessary for a complete understanding of the library censorship
cases.
The right to receive cases began with Martin v. City of
Struthers,"' a 1943 case in which a city ordinance making it unlaw-
ful to ring doorbells and distribute literature was held invalid
under the first amendment. The ordinance was held invalid in part
because it failed to distinguish between potential recipients who
were willing to receive the information and those who were not." 2
While the Martin decision was grounded chiefly on the plaintiff's
first amendment right to distribute information," 3 stress was also
106. Meildejohn, The Reconciliation of First Amendment Freedoms with Local
Control over the Moral Development of Minors, 12 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205,
1220 (1978).
107. Id.
108. Letwin, supra note 63, at 144.
109. Id.
110. See notes 144-94 & accompanying text infra.
111. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
112. Id. at 147-49.
113. Id. at 145-47.
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placed on the right of the willing recipient to receive informa-
tion.114 In his plurality opinion, Justice Black observed that the
authors of the first amendment "chose to encourage a freedom
which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever
to triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the
right to distribute literature ... and necessarily protects the right
to receive it."115
The second significant case dealing with the right to receive in-
formation was Lamont v. Postmaster General,"6 decided in 1965.
In Lamont, the Court considered the constitutionality of a federal
law which required the postal service to detain and destroy un-
sealed foreign mail which was determined to be communist polit-
ical propaganda, unless the addressee, after notification from the
postal service, returned a separate reply card requesting delivery
of the mail." 7 The Court held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it required "an official act (viz., returning the reply
card) as a limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's
First Amendment rights."118 The Court appeared to rely upon a
right to receive information rationale," 9 noting that the statute's
reply card requirement as a condition precedent to receiving the
mail amounted to "an affirmative obligation which we do not think
the Government may impose on [the addressee]."1
20
The next stage in the development of the right to receive infor-
mation theory occurred in Stanley v. Georgia.121 In this 1969 deci-
sion, a statute which made the private possession of obscene
material in one's home a criminal offense was held to violate the
first and fourteenth amendments.122 The Court called the right to
receive information and ideas, "regardless of their social worth,"
both "well established" and "fundamental to our free society."' 23
The Court also expressed concern that judicial condoning of state
action which diminished this right would lead to government con-
trol of the minds of men and women, a concept abhorrent to basic
114. Id. at 149.
115. Id. at 143 (footnotes omitted).
116. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
117. Id. at 302-03.
118. Id. at 305.
119. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion expressly stated that the right to re-
ceive publications is a fundamental right and warned that "[t]he dissemina-
tion of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not
free to receive and consider them." Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 307.
121. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
122. Id. at 568.
123. Id. at 564. Additionally, the Court viewed the law as an unwarranted intru-




notions underlying the Constitution.124
The Court again relied upon the right to receive information ra-
tionale in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,125 in which it held
that FCC regulations mandating the reservation of broadcasting
time for rebuttal of personal attacks and political editorializing
arising out of discussions of controversial public issues did not in-
hibit the first amendment freedom of speech. 26 The Court deter-
mined that the regulations would actually advance the first
amendment rights of the listening public, and stated: "It is the
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences .... ,,127
The 1974 case of Procunier v. Martinez128 involved another ap-
plication of the right to receive information theory, and focused on
the freedom to participate in the communication process. In strik-
ing down certain prison mail censorship rules as violative of the
first amendment,129 the Court's opinion, written by Justice Powell,
included the following observation:
Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence
with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not
depend on whether the non-prisoner correspondent is the author or in-
tended recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the
sender of personal correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth
Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference
with the intended communication.
130
The foregoing cases, particularly Martinez, set the stage for the
case which solidified the right to receive information: Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.'31 There the Court struck down a Virginia statute which pro-
vided that a licensed pharmacist who advertised the price of a drug
available only by prescription was guilty of unprofessional con-
duct.132 The statute was found to be an invalid suppression of
124. Id. at 565. The right to receive information asserted by student plaintiffs in
library censorship cases has sometimes been termed the "right to read." The
Stanley opinion twice made reference to a "right to read" as part of a right to
further intellectual and emotional interests. Id. at 565, 568.
125. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
126. Id. at 375. The regulations, designed to further the fairness doctrine, required
that one personally attacked during a broadcast dealing with a controversial
public issue be given an opportunity, by the station broadcasting the pro-
gram, to respond. Id. at 373-74.
127. Id. at 390.
128. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
129. Id. at 415.
130. Id. at 408-09.
131. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
132. Id. at 773. The case is primarily notable for its holding that commercial
speech is not entirely removed from first amendment protection. Id. at 762.
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truthful speech about lawful commercial activity. The significance
of Virginia Board of Pharmacy to the library censorship cases is
that the plaintiffs challenging the law were not pharmacists who
wished to advertise, but were prospective recipients of the adver-
tising prohibited by the law.133 The Court held that their right to
receive the advertising gave them the right to maintain the ac-
tion.134 In reaching this result, the Court recognized that the right
to receive information and ideas had received protection in prior
cases. 135 Then, apparently picking up on the Martinez reference to
protecting intended communication, 36 the Court stated: "Where a
speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."137 The
Court observed that "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising," and that this separate
right to receive information could be asserted by the plaintiffs, who
were potential recipients of advertisements.13 8 The Court's hold-
ing has been offered by student plaintiffs in the book removal
cases as authority for their suits contesting the removals even
though the "speakers," the authors whose works were removed
from use, were not also plaintiffs.139 The scope of the right to know
after the Virginia Board of Pharmacy case has been summarized
as follows:
A right to know at times means nothing more than a mirror of such a
right to speak, a listener's right that government not interfere with a will-
ing speaker's liberty. But the right to know at times means more: it may
include an individual's right to acquire desired information or ideas free of
governmental veto, undue hindrance, or unwarranted exposure. Such a
right to know may entail no correlative right in any particular source to
originate the communication. 14 o
V. THE LIBRARY CENSORSHIP CASES
The library censorship cases may be divided into three groups:
133. Id. at 756.
134. Id. at 757.
135. Id. at 756-57.
136. See note 130 & accompanying text supra.
137. 425 U.S. at 756 (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at 757.
139. See Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976);
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read
Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
140. L. TRME, AM cAN CONSTrrtmONAL LAw 675-76 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
As authority for the final sentence quoted in the text, Professor Tribe cited
Virginia Board of Pharmacy and observed that the consumer plaintiffs vindi-
cated the right to receive the information through advertising. He added that
no pharmacist or seller was a party to the action, and "it is not clear that such




first, the Sixth Circuit's decision of Minarcini v. Strongsville City
School District'41 and the decisions which have followed its lead in
protecting student rights in book removal situations; second, the
Second Circuit's three book removal cases which have culminated
in inconsistent results; and third, the Seventh Circuit's decision
upholding the actions of the defendant school officials in Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corp.142
A. The Minarcini Approach
The 1976 Minarcini decision was the first case in which it was
held that a school board's decision to remove certain books from
use in a secondary school violated the students' first amendment
rights.143 Central to the Minarcini approach is the theory that
when a book removal by school officials cannot be explained in
content-neutral terms, there has been an infringement of the stu-
dents' first amendment rights to receive information. 44 Under the
Minarcini approach, school officials do not have unfettered discre-
tion in determining whether to remove certain books from use.145
In Minarcini, five high school students in Strongsville, Ohio,
brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the school dis-
trict, 4 6 the board of education, and the school superintendent.147
The plaintiffs alleged that their first and fourteenth amendment
rights had been infringed by: (1) the board of education's refusal,
contrary to the recommendation of the faculty, to approve the use
of Joseph Heller's Catch 22 and Kurt Vonnegut's God Bless You,
Mr. Rosewater as texts or library books; and (2) the board's orders
removing Catch 22 and Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle from the library
and prohibiting both class discussion and supplemental reading
use of the books. 4 8 The Sixth Circuit held in favor of the students
on the second part of their claim, 49 but found no constitutional
infirmity in the board's withholding approval of the first two books
listed above.150
141. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
142. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
143. 541 F.2d at 584.
144. See notes 158-61 & accompanying text infra.
145. See notes 154-55 & accompanying text infra.
146. This was not the first time the Strongsville City School District had been in-
volved in a case relating to a book controversy. In the prior instance, how-
ever, the plaintiffs' complaint was diametrically opposed to the plaintiffs'
complaint in MinarcinL See note 53 supra.
147. 541 F.2d at 578-79.
148. Id. at 579.
149. Id. at 584. The court directed the district court to order that the removed
books be replaced in the library. Id.
150. Id. at 580, 584. The Minarcini court briefly addressed the board's refusal to
give initial approval to certain works. It noted that Ohio law placed upon
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With regard to the book removal issue, the court considered the
conclusion inescapable that the board removed the books because
it found their contents objectionable and felt it had unrestricted
freedom to "censor the school library for subject matter which the
Board members found distasteful."151 The court could find no ex-
planation for the board's action which was neutral in first amend-
ment terms. 52
In addressing whether the board of education had an unfet-
tered power to remove books from use, the Minarcini court found
it necessary to examine the only prior book removal case, Presi-
dents Council, District 25 v. Community School Board No. 25,153 in
which the school officials' actions were upheld. The court ob-
served that it would be unwise to read Presidents Council for the
proposition that school boards had absolute authority, unlimited
by the first amendment, to remove books from use. The court ad-
ded that if Presidents Council had been intended to stand for such
a proposition, the Sixth Circuit would regard it as incorrect and
decline to follow it.'54 Instead, the Minarcini court stated that the
first amendment prohibited board members from randomly remov-
ing books from the library because the contents of the books occa-
sioned the displeasure or disapproval of certain board members. 55
However, the board could have removed a book because the li-
brary's copy of it had worn out, because the book had become ob-
solete, because there was a shortage of shelf space, or because of
some other justification neutral in first amendment terms.156 But
Minarcini made clear that even though a school district did not
have an obligation to provide a library for its students, once it pro-
vided a library, the school board could not unreasonably condition
local boards of education the duty to select the books for use in the school
system, and stated that it found no constitutional problem with the discretion
exercised by the board when it refused to select the works cited by the plain-
tiffs. Id. at 579-80. For further discussion of the book selection issue, as op-
posed to book removal once selection has been made, see notes 261-72 &
accompanying text infra.
151. Id. at 582. According to the court, the only evidence of the reasons for the
board's decision to remove the books was in a citizens book review commit-
tee minority report, which had been read into the record of a board meeting
by a board member. That report referred to God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater,
one of the books the board refused to approve, as "'completely sick"' and
"'GARBAGE."' Id. at 581. In addition, the same report recommended that
"'Cat's Cradle, which was written by the same character (Vennegutter) [sic]
who wrote, using the term loosely, God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater.... be
withdrawn immediately."' Id.
152. Id. at 582.
153. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).





and restrict the use of the library by such actions as removing
books for reasons "related solely to the social or political tastes of
school board members.'
5 7
Significant in the Minarcini determination that the book remov-
als were unconstitutional'5 8 was the recognition that the student
plaintiffs possessed a first amendment right to receive the informa-
tion contained in the removed books. The court, stating that it was
dealing with a more difficult concept than a direct prohibition of
speech, stressed that "we are concerned with the right of students
to receive information which they and their teachers desire them
to have."' 59 In extending this right to students in secondary
schools, the court relied on Virginia Board of Pharmacy and its
forerunners. 60 This extension of the right to receive information
to students has been hailed as a recognition of the vital role a free
flow of information, unimpeded by government interference, plays
in the educational process.'
6 '
Under the Minarcini analysis, a school board could not success-
fully argue that because students were able to obtain the removed
books from other sources, their right to receive information had
not been impaired. The Minarcini court's statement that the
school library constitutes a "mighty resource in the free market-
place of ideas,' 62 implies that the students' rights to receive infor-
157. Id. at 582 (footnotes omitted). Apparently the court viewed the book remov-
als as going beyond reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, which
traditionally have been regarded as acceptable limitations on the exercise of
first amendment rights. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
158. 541 F.2d at 584.
159. Id. at 583.
160. Id. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court cases in which the
right to receive or know was developed, see notes 111-41 & accompanying text
supra.
161. See ONeil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CIN. I. REV.
209, 211, 239 (1973) (advocating recognition of students' rights to receive infor-
mation and criticizing the Presidents Council decision for failing to recognize
them); Comment, Right to Read Defense Committee of Chelsea v. School Com-
mittee of the City of Chelsea, 14 N. ENG. L REv. 288, 315 (1978).
A student's right to receive information has also been recognized in a con-
text other than the school library. In Paton v. LaPrade, 469 F. Supp. 773
(D.NJ. 1978), a high school student who sought information for a social stud-
ies class wrote to the Socialist Workers Party and soon was investigated by
the FBL Id. at 774-75. The court held that a postal regulation authorizing
"mail covers" (which involved the copying down of all information on the
outside of the envelope) by the FBI to protect the national security was un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 774. The court found that free-
dom of speech protects the right to receive information and that the recipient
"had a right to receive her requested information free of government interfer-
ence." Id. at 777-78.
162. Id. at 582. The marketplace of ideas concept, as a first amendment theory,




mation and the school library's role as an unbiased resource in the
marketplace of ideas are inextricably intertwined: if the library is
not free to operate and offer a variety of viewpoints, the exercise of
the right to receive is necessarily impaired.163 Thus the availabil-
ity of books from other sources is immaterial.164
The Minarcini approach to book removal cases was adopted
and solidified in two district court cases from the First Circuit. In
the first of these cases, Right to Read Defense Committee v. School
Committee,165 students challenged the school board's removal of
an anthology entitled Male and Female Under 18 from the li-
brary.166 The removal was precipitated by a parental complaint
about a poem contained in the anthology and by the school board
chairman's campaign to remove the book because of the poem.1
67
The poem, written by a fifteen-year old New York City girl and ti-
tled "The City to a Young Girl," presumably was objectionable be-
cause of the poem's sexual overtones and the terms used to refer
to parts of the female anatomy.16
8
The court concluded that Male and Female Under 18 was im-
permissibly removed from the library because the school board re-
garded the disputed poem's theme and language as offensive.169
Following the Minarcini lead, the court noted that while not every
book removal necessarily implicated first amendment interests, a
removal predicated on the subjective determinations of the board
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (describing the class-
room as the marketplace of ideas). The classic marketplace model centers
around the theory that where debate and the flow of information are free and
uninterfered with by government, truth will be discovered and insight gained.
See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 967 (1978).
163. See Comment, supra note 161, at 297, wherein the author asserted: "Central
to students' right to read is the notion that the classroom, the library and, in
fact, the whole educational milieu rests upon the marketplace of ideas
model." Id.
On the other hand, it has been noted that the notion that the school is a
marketplace of ideas has not been universally accepted and that school
boards are under no obligation to open up the school curriculum to each view
which someone would like to further. Note, supra note 16, at 1040.
164. 541 F.2d at 582. See Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275
(D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp.
703, 715 n.19 (D. Mass. 1978).
165. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
166. 454 F. Supp. at 704-05.
167. 454 F. Supp. at 704-05, 707. In editorials in the newspaper of which he was
editor, the board chairman referred to the poem as "'obviously obscene,"'
"'filthy,"' and "'vile and offensive garbage."' Id. at 707. At a board meeting,
he called the poem "'low down dirty rotten filth, garbage, fit only for the
sewer.'" Id. at 708.
168. Id. at 704-05.
169. Id. at 710-11.
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members that the theme and language were offensive entitled stu-
dents to seek the court's aid in vindicating their first amendment
rights. 7 0 The Right to Read court further mirrored Minarcini by
stressing the importance of the students' first amendment rights to
read and be exposed to controversial ideas,171 and by refusing to
interpret the Presidents Council decision as granting school offi-
cials an absolute, unfettered power to remove books from use.1 7 2
Probably the only significant addition made to the Minarcini
calculus by the Right to Read court was the formulation of a test to
be employed in book removal cases. The court held that although
the Tinker standard of material and substantial disruption of
school operations' 7 3 was not especially useful in the book removal
context, the principles underlying Tinker pointed to an appropri-
ate test for determining the validity of a book removal. For the
school officials' actions to be constitutionally valid, the officials
must demonstrate "some substantial and legitimate government
interest" 7 4 in removing the book, and that interest must be com-
parable in significance to school discipline.75 According to the
court, no such interest had been shown by the board in Right to
Read. Expert testimony had established that the removed book
had had no damaging effect on students and was of at least some
value. 7 6 Moreover, the court noted that parental objections to the
language employed in a book were not determinative of the book's
value.1
77
170. Id. at 712.
171. Id. at 714.
172. Id. at 711. The court expressed grave concern about any arm of government
"having such an unreviewable power of censorship." Id. at 714. It stated that
to condone the book removal at issue would be to set a dangerous precedent
for future removals and to run the risk of gradually "sanitizing" the school
library of views divergent from those of the board. Id. The court also ex-
pressed fears that mind control would be the inevitable result if actions such
as that taken by the defendants were approved by the courts: "The most ef-
fective antidote to the poison of mindless orthodoxy is ready access to a
broad sweep of ideas and philosophies. There is no danger in such exposure.
The danger is in mind control." Id. at 715. This language is reminiscent of
that of the Supreme Court in several cases. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
173. See notes 65-66 & accompanying text supra.
174. 454 F. Supp. at 713.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. The Right to Read court saw a legitimate purpose behind the language
employed in the poem at issue:
City is not a polite poem. Its language is tough, but not obscene.
Whether or not scholarly, the poem is challenging and thought-pro-
voking. It employs vivid street language, legitimately offensive to
1982]
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In the second district court case to follow the Minarcini ap-
proach, Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education,17 8 students chal-
lenged the validity of the school board's decision to remove certain
issues of MS magazine from the library and to place excised ver-
sions of other issues of the magazine in the library. The Salvail
court concluded that the issues of MS magazine had been ordered
removed from the library because of their political content.179 This
amounted to an impermissible restriction on the use of the library
for reasons related solely to the board members' social and polit-
ical tastes.180 The court followed the path broken by Minarcini
and Right to Read by rejecting the proposition that school officials
have an absolute power to remove library materials from use,181
and by recognizing that students have a right to receive informa-
tion which would be infringed by a publication's removal based on
the board members' personal objections to its political content.
182
The Salvail court adopted the Right to Read test 8 3 that officials
must justify the removal of a publication by demonstrating a sub-
stantial and legitimate government interest furthered in doing
so.184 The court concluded that no such interest had been demon-
strated by the school board, and as such, "the action taken by the
[board-member] defendants contravened the plaintiffs' first
amendment rights and was plainly wrong."'
8 5
The following conclusions can be drawn from the approach
some, but certainly not to everyone. The author is writing about her
perception of city life in rough but relevant language that gives credi-
bility to the development of a sensitive theme. City's words may
shock, but they communicate.
Id. at 714.
See Keefe v. Geanokos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969), in which the court held
in favor of a teacher whom school officials sought to dismiss after he had as-
signed his high school English class an Atlantic Monthly article containing
the word "motherfucker" and had discussed the word's origin, context, and
use by the author. Id. at 361. The court initially remarked that the word
clearly was known by many high school students, and that if the "shock
[would be] too great for high school seniors to stand," the court feared for the
students' future. Id. It added that with the "greatest of respect" for parents
offended by the use of the word, "their sensibilities are not the full measure
of what is proper education." Id. at 361-62. The court saw a valid educational
purpose in discussing the word in the context in which the author had used
it. Id. at 361.
178. 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
179. Id. at 1274.
180. Id. at 1272, 1274.
181. Id. at 1274.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1275. See note 174 & accompanying text supra.
184. 469 F. Supp. at 1275.
185. Id. at 1275-76 (emphasis in original).
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taken in Minarcini, as supplemented by the Right to Read and Sal-
vail decisions:
1. School officials do not have unlimited authority to remove
books from libraries when the books have been previously placed
in use;1
86
2. Students possess a first amendment right to receive infor-
mation and to have access to diverse viewpoints, and this right is
infringed where school officials remove materials from use be-
cause of those officials' personal objections to the ideas expressed
in the materials;187 and
3. Where school officials appear to have removed a book previ-
ously in use for reasons other than the lack of shelf space or be-
cause the book is worn out or obsolete,18 8 the school officials must
demonstrate a substantial and legitimate government interest fur-
thered by the removal. 8 9
The vitality of the Minarcini decision and its progeny depends
upon the approach which the Supreme Court takes in deciding the
book removal case now before it.190
B. The Second Circuit Approach
The Second Circuit's 1972 decision in Presidents Council, Dis-
trict 25 v. Community School Board No. 25191 was the first decision
rendered in the library censorship area. The seemingly rigid
stance of Presidents Council192 has been weakened by the Second
Circuit's recent companion decisions in Pico v. Board of Educa-
tion193 and Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Board of Di-
rectors.194 Whether there will be a return to the Presidents
Council approach of allowing school officials sweeping authority to
remove books will be determined by the Supreme Court when it
decides Pico.
In Presidents Council, a number of plaintiffs, including junior
high school students and their parents,195 brought suit under 42
186. See notes 153-55, 172, 181 & accompanying text supra.
187. See notes 158-61, 171, 182 & accompanying text supra.
188. See note 156 & accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 174, 183-84 & accompanying text supra.
190. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.LW.
3265 (1981) (No. 80-2043).
191. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
192. Its holding that no first amendment infringement occurred when the defend-
ant school board removed a book has been characterized as insensitive.
O'Neil, supra note 161, at 212.
193. 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (1981) (No. 80-2043).
194. 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
195. Other plaintiffs included teachers, a librarian, a school principal, and a par-
ent-teacher association. 457 F.2d at 290.
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U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the school board's removal of a book
from the libraries of junior high schools in the district violated
their first amendment rights. The book removed was the novel
Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas. 9 6 After its removal de-
cision, the board decided to allow schools which already had the
book to keep it, and to allow those schools to loan the book to par-
ents, but not students.197 The court held that plaintiffs had not
made out a claim of a first amendment violation98 and affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of their complaint.199
Two facts were central to the court's determination that there
had been no first amendment violation. First, the subject por-
trayed in the removed book still could be discussed in class, and
second, the parents who wanted their children to be exposed to the
book could borrow it from the school and make it available to
them.200 Probably the most significant aspect of the case was the
court's willingness to accept sweeping book-removal authority on
the part of school boards. The court noted that state law had given
the board the power to make book selections,20' and indicated that
the board had to remain free to manage the library collection with-
out intermeddling by the judiciary.2 0 2
Under the Presidents Council approach, school officials have a
virtual free rein in matters such as book removal:
The administration of any library, whether it be a university or particu-
larly a public junior high school, involves a constant process of selection
and winnowing based not only on educational needs but financial and ar-
chitectural realities. To suggest that the shelving or unshelving of books
presents a constitutional issue, particularly where there is no showing of a
curtailment of freedom of speech or thought, is a proposition we cannot
accept.
2 0 3
The court again manifested its deference to the board's judgment
by rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that once a book was shelved,
it could not be removed absent a showing of some significant gov-
ernment interest. According to the court, there was no basis for
such a "book tenure" argument, because "books which become ob-
solete or irrelevant or where improperly selected initially, for
whatever reason, can be removed by the same authority which was
196. 457 F.2d at 289-90. The court called the novel an account of a boy's growing up
in Spanish Harlem, and stated that it contained considerable profanity, as
well as episodes dealing with violence, sex, and drug use. Id. at 291.
197. Id. at 290.
198. Id. at 291-92.
199. Id. at 289-90.
200. Id. at 292.
201. Id. at 290.
202. Id. at 291-92.
203. Id. at 293 (footnotes omitted).
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empowered to make the selection in the first place."20 4
What seemed an unbending approach in Presidents Council
was altered in the Pico and Bicknell cases, decided concurrently
by the Second Circuit late in 1980. The panel deciding the two
cases consisted of Judge Mansfield, who opted to continue to ap-
proach such cases along the lines established in Presidents Coun-
cil, and Judges Newman and Sifton,205 who were willing to depart
from the rigid Presidents Council posture but could not agree on
when to do so and why.206
In Pico, some board of education members attended a confer-
ence held by a conservative New York parents group and received
written information concerning certain allegedly objectionable
books. This written information contained comments of a political
or social nature by book reviewers connected with the conserva-
tive group, as well as quotations of allegedly indecent language
and descriptions of sexual behavior that were contained in the
books.207 Upon returning from the conference, the board members
determined that eleven of the books referred to in this information
were in use in the school district, and the board directed the school
principals to remove them from use.208
At a later meeting, the board, chiefly because of the protests of
the superintendent of schools, appointed a committee composed of
staff members and parents to review the books the board had or-
dered removed. Although the committee reviewed the books and
204. Id. The vast sweep of Presidents Council and its implicit deep bow to school
officials' determinations troubled Justice Douglas, who dissented from the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the case. Presidents Council, Dist. 25
v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
998 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) Justice Douglas re-
ferred to a right "to hear, to learn, [and] to know" which is of "great impor-
tance in the schools," id. at 999, and called the issues raised in the case
"crucial to our national life." Id. at 1000. He emphasized his displeasure with
the Second Circuit's approach in Presidents Council by posing a series of
questions:
What else can the School Board now decide it does not like? How
else will its sensibilities be offended? Are we sending children to
school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or are we
educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the past, to explore all
forms of thought, and to find solutions to our world's problems?
Id. at 999-1000.
205. Judge Sifton is a district judge who was sitting by designation. 638 F.2d at 406,
440.
206. See notes 212-32 and accompanying text inffra.
207. 638 F.2d at 407-08.
208. Id. at 409. When newspapers began covering the story, the board issued a
press release stating that the allegedly offensive books contained material
"'offensive to Christians, Jews, Blacks, and Americans in general. In addi-
tion, these books contain obscenities, blasphemies, brutality, and perversion
beyond description."' Id. at 410.
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recommended that eight of them be returned to use in the class-
room or library, the board voted to return only two of them and
again voted to remove the other nine.
20 9
The students filed suit and, in a class action, alleged that the
removals of the books from the curriculum and the library in-
fringed their first amendment rights. The district court granted a
summary judgment for the defendant board,210 but on appeal the
Second Circuit, departing from the rigidity of Presidents Council,
reversed and remanded for trial.
2 11
Judge Sifton, authoring the court's opinion, 212 disposed of the
obstacle posed by Presidents Council by classifying it as an ordi-
nary book removal situation in which a student's allegation that a
controversial book had been removed from use would be insuffi-
cient to state a prima facie case of a first amendment violation.21 3
However, in the extraordinary circumstances in Pico,214 the court
found plaintiffs had stated a prima facie case by showing the fact of
the book removal, an irregular intervention by the board in library
operations, and the questionable explanations given by the board
to support its actions. 21 5 Judge Sifton attempted to clarify his test
for a prima facie case:
209. Id. at 410-11. The nine books which remained banished were: Slaughterhouse
Five, by Kurt Vonnegut; The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down these
Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas; Go Ask Alice, by Anonymous; A Hero Ain't
Nothing But A Sandwich, by Alice Childress; Soul on Ice, by Eldridge
Cleaver; The Fixer, by Bernard Malamud; A Reader for Writers, edited by
Jerome Archer; and Best Short Stories by Negro Writers, edited by Langston
Hughes.
Vonnegut's works have frequently been the object of parental or school
board complaints when they have been used in the public schools. See, e.g.,
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) (God
Bless You, Mr. Rosewater and Cat's Cradle); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F.
Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (teacher dismissal case in which teacher had as-
signed Vonnegut's short story Welcome to the Monkey House); Todd v. Roch-
ester Community Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972) (parental
complaint about Slaughterhouse Five).
210. Id. at 406.
211. Id. at 407. It is surprising that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear Pico in
view of the fact that no trial record has been developed. Professor Alan Der-
showitz has been quoted as terming the Supreme Court's taking of the Pico
case despite the absence of a trial record as "another example of the absurd
hypocrisy of judicial restraint"' espoused by various members of the largely
conservative Supreme Court. Lauter, Can School Board Ban Library Books?,
Nat'l L.J., Oct. 26, 1981, at 5, col. 1.
212. 638 F.2d at 406. Judge Newman concurred in the result on grounds similar to
those stated by Judge Sifton. Id. at 432. Judge Mansfield dissented. Id. at
419.
213. Id. at 414.




In this case... we are presented with more than the inferences to be
drawn from the act of removing controversial texts from library shelves,
and more than the clearly understood, routine and regular task of select-
ing titles for a school library. What we have instead is an unusual and
irregular intervention in the school libraries' operations by persons not
routinely concerned with such matters. Moreover, this intervention has
occurred under circumstances, including the explanations for their ac-
tions given by the participants, which so far from clarifying the scope and
intentions behind the official action, create instead grave questions con-
cerning both subjects. In circumstances of such irregularity and ambigu-
ity, a primafacie case is made out and intervention of a federal court is
warranted because of the very infrequency with which it may be assumed
such intervention will be necessary and because of the real threat that the
school officials' irregular and ambiguous handling of the issue will, even
despite the best intentions, create misunderstanding as to the scope of
their activities which will serve to suppress freedom of expression.
2 16
According to the court, once the plaintiff established a prima
facie case under the complicated test set forth above, the burden of
persuasion shifted to the defendant school officials to show that
their actions had a substantial basis, were procedurally regular,
217
and did not burden free expression any more than was necessary
to further substantial government interests. The allegations of the
plaintiffs in Pico tended to show that the board acted in what
Judge Sifton called an "erratic, arbitrary and free-wheeling man-
ner"2 18 seemingly indicative of an intent to establish certain ortho-
dox ideas for the community while suppressing others. 219 Judge
Sifton's focus appeared to be on whether the board members were
seeking to establish their own ideas as the doctrine of the commu-
nity with the intention of suppressing the expression of contrary
ideas.
In his concurrence, Judge Newman took a stance similar to that
216. Id.
217. Id. at 416-17.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 417. Examples of the board's irregular actions cited by Judge Sifton
included: the board's removal of the books only on the basis of the informa-
tion provided, without the board members having read them; the board's ap-
parent attempt to create public uproar by bringing the issue into an
upcoming election and by conducting a district-wide poll; the board's confu-
sion and incoherence regarding its reasons for removal; the board's ex post
facto appointment of a committee to review the books and subsequent disre-
gard of the committee's recommendation without reason; the board's failure
to heed the strong objections of the professional staff to the procedures it
employed; and the board's "substantive" irregularity in ordering the removal
of works by recognized authors. Id. at 416-18.
Judge Sifton appeared to state that board members were free to make de-
cisions based on their personal political views or views concerning taste and
morality, so long as those decisions were not accompanied by outrageous acts




of Judge Sifton. Judge Newman focused on the danger that book
removals would lead to suppression of ideas and stated that while
a book removal was not per se a violation of the first amendment,
there was a first amendment violation where the book removal
suppressed certain ideas and placed them beyond the realm of
free discussion. 20 He indicated that a removal of a previously se-
lected book was much more likely to convey the idea that certain
ideas were off-limits than was the initial failure or refusal to select
a book.221 Where ideas contained in books were suppressed, stu-
dents perceived an "official message" that those ideas were unac-
ceptable or wrong, and they were impermissibly chilled from
expressing those ideas. 222 It is interesting to note that Judge New-
man's opinion merely cited the Minarcini line of cases, without
any significant discussion,223 and that Judge Sifton's opinion made
no mention whatsoever of those cases. Neither opinion devoted
any discussion to the students' purported rights to receive
information.
In Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Board of Direc-
tors, 2 2 4 the companion case to Pico, the Second Circuit held that
the student plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action by their alle-
gations that the board's decision to remove Richard Price's The
Wanderers from the library and to place Patrick Mann's Dog Day
Afternoon on a restricted shelf violated their first amendment
rights. The students had sought to enjoin the board's actions on
the grounds that they were motivated by the board members'
desires to impose their personal tastes and values on the students,
thereby impairing the students' rights to receive information.
225
Judge Newman's opinion in Bicknell revealed three factors
220. Id. at 432-33, 434 (Newman, J., concurring in result).
221. Id. at 435-36.
222. Id. at 434. While Judge Newman indicated that school officials have consider-
able latitude in regulating vulgar language and explicit sexual descriptions,
id. at 436, he felt that the facts showed a distinct possibility that ideas were
being suppressed. Id. at 437.
In dissent, Judge Mansfield stated that Presidents Council could not be
distinguished from the case at hand and that Judges Sifton and Newman
were implicitly overruling the 1972 decision. Id. at 419 (Mansfield, J., dissent-
ing). He cited Supreme Court cases such as Ginsberg v. New York and FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation as authority for the proposition that children may be
protected from exposure to indecent language. Id. at 427. See notes 93-105
and accompanying text supra. Judge Mansfield felt that the defendant acted
on such a basis and not with the intent to suppress ideas. 638 F.2d at 427.
Choosing to follow the previously trodden ground of Presidents Council,
Judge Mansfield saw no unconstitutional action in the removal of "a handful
of books containing indecent expressions." Id. at 429.
223. 638 F.2d at 435.
224. 638 F.2d 438, 440-41.
225. Id. at 441 n.2.
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which compelled a result different from that reached in Pico. First,
the board action was taken following parental complaints concern-
ing "the vulgarity and indecency 22 6 of language in the books. Sec-
ond, the plaintiffs' complaint acknowledged "that the Board acted
in both instances because of the books' vulgar and indecent lan-
guage. '227 Third, school officials had the power to regulate vulgar-
ity and explicit sexual content.228
According to the court in Bicknell, the Pico case "recognized a
First Amendment right of members of a school community to be
free of the inhibiting effects upon free expression that result when
the circumstances surrounding the removal of books create a risk
of suppressing ideas." 229 However, Judge Newman observed no
facts tending to indicate a risk of idea suppression in Bicknell. The
complaint contained no allegations that the books were removed
because of the ideas contained in them or that the board "acted
because of political motivation."
230
The plaintiffs' argument that the determination of vulgarity and
indecency could not be based on the board members' personal
tastes was rejected by Judge Newman. He stated that "so long as
the materials removed are permissibly considered to be vulgar or
indecent, it is no cause for legal complaint that the Board members
applied their own standards of taste about vulgarity."23 1 He also
disposed of the plaintiffs' right to receive argument on the ground
that "young students have no constitutionally protected right of ac-
cess on school property to material that, whatever its literary mer-
its, is fairly characterized as vulgar and indecent in the school
context."
232
After Pico and BickneUl, the following observations can be
226. Id. at 440.
227. Id. at 440-41.
228. Id. at 441.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (footnote omitted).
232. Id. at n.2. Judge Mansfield offered a one paragraph concurrence, stating that
while he accepted the Bicknell result, he did not see any difference between
Bicknell and Pico. Therefore, he would have dismissed both complaints. Id.
at 442. (Mansfield, J., concurring in result). Judge Sifton, in dissent, agreed
with Judge Mansfield that there was no basis for distinguishing Bicknell from
Pico. Therefore, he would have held that the Bicknell plaintiffs had also
made out a prima facie case and that trial was necessary in order to deter-
mine whether the board was suppressing ideas under the guise of regulating
indecency and vulgarity. Id. at 442-43 (Sifton, J., dissenting). Judge Sifton
noted that the board in Bicknell had failed to follow its own library policies
and that this was the kind of procedural irregularity which, in Pico, had been
regarded as an indication that the board was suppressing ideas. Id. at 443.
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made concerning the Second Circuit's approach to book removal
cases:
1. School officials are no longer viewed as having unlimited
power to remove books;233
2. Where a book removal is accompanied by facts showing ir-
regular intervention by the school board in library operations and
an intent to establish certain ideas as proper and to suppress
others, the book removal is impermissible;234 and
3. Where school officials remove a book from use because of
the book's vulgar language or explicit sexual content, the removal
is a permissible exercise of the officials' discretion.
2 35
The Supreme Court's decision in Pico should reveal whether the
Second Circuit's current approach will become the standard to be
followed in book removal cases.
C. The Zykan Approach
In Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 2 3 6 a 1980 case
decided prior to the Second Circuit's tandem decisions in Pico and
Bicknell, the Seventh Circuit approached the student plaintiffs'
book removal and related claims primarily through an academic
freedom theory. The court held that none of the claims made by
the students were sufficient to constitute a cause of action; accord-
ingly, it affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the amended com-
plaint.237 However, the court held that the plaintiffs should have
been given leave to amend their complaint again because their
claims were novel, and it was possible that a constitutional claim
could have been stated along the lines the plaintiffs were
pursuing.238
Among the actions alleged unconstitutional by the Zykan plain-
tiffs were the school board's removal of the book Go Ask Alice
from the high school library, the board's discontinuance of the use
of the textbook Values Clarification, and the principal's order to an
English teacher not to use Growing Up Female in America, Go Ask
Alice, The Stepford Wives, and The Bell Jar in a course dealing
with women in literature.2 39 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that
the board's policy against using reading material that "'might be
objectionable' "240 led to the impermissible excision of parts of Stu-
233. See notes 212-22 and accompanying text supra.
234. See notes 215-22 and accompanying text supra.
235. See notes 226-32 and accompanying text supra.
236. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
237. Id. at 1301-02.
238. Id. at 1308-09.
239. Id. at 1302, 1302 nn.3 & 4.
240. Id. at 1302.
[Vol. 61:98
LIBRARY CENSORSHIP
dent Critic, a long-used book.241 Plaintiffs claimed the above ac-
tions were taken solely because the contents of the books offended
the board members' tastes242 and that the students' rights to read
and to academic freedom had been violated.
243
The Zykan court viewed the students' claims primarily from an
academic freedom standpoint. It stated that academic freedom
was a concept which recognized the importance of keeping the aca-
demic community free from ideological coercion.244 However, the
court noted that academic freedom had limited relevance at the
secondary school level because of the students' limited intellectual
and emotional maturity and because of the public school's tradi-
tional role in encouraging and instilling basic community values.
245
Contrary to the position taken in the Minarcini line of cases (and
perhaps that taken in Pico), the Zykan court stated that in an ef-
fort to transmit their community values, local boards of education
were relatively free "to make educational decisions based upon
their personal, social, political and moral views."246 However, the
court pointed out that the board does not have completely unfet-
tered discretion in the areas of curriculum and instructional
materials. If there were a '"lagrant abuse of discretion," indicating
that the board was not merely making choices concerning educa-
tional matters of legitimate dispute, but was attempting to impose
exclusive indoctrination into one way of thinking, the court im-
241. Id. The students also claimed constitutional violations in the board's elimi-
nation of several courses from the curriculum and its decision not to rehire
two teachers. Id. at 1302-03. The plaintiffs alleged that the courses were elim-
inated because their contents offended the board members' social, political,
and moral beliefs. The students alleged that the decision not to rehire the
teachers infringed upon the academic freedom of both students and teachers.
Id. at 1302-03. The court matter-of-factly rejected the students' argument con-
cerning the teacher dismissals, stating that the students possessed no right to
be taught by those teachers. Id. at 1307.
242. Id. at 1302.
243. Id. at 1302-03. Plaintiffs sought to have the books restored to use and the cur-
riculum changes reversed. Id. at 1303.
The plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged that the board went beyond the
mere removal of the books from the school. Purportedly the board, at the
request of a local senior citizens group, conveyed the books to the group for a
public burning. Id. at 1302 n.2. While the court regarded the burning as a
"contemptible ceremony" of which "[n]o self-respecting citizen" would ap-
prove, it stated that the book burning had only a tenuous relationship to the
students' claims and that the students' book removal and related claims did
not sufficiently state constitutional violations, regardless of whether the court
took the book burning incident into account. Id.
244. Id. at 1304.
245. Id. For a discussion of this traditional role played by the public schools, see
notes 15-19 & accompanying text supra.
246. 631 F.2d at 1305. According to the court, actions based on such views gener-
ally are "neither capricious nor arbitrary nor unreasonable." Id. at 1307 n.8.
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plied that it would intervene.247
Although the court indicated that its discussion of the limited
role of academic freedom at the secondary school level and the im-
portance of giving the board latitude in its attempts to inculcate
community values would adequately dispose of the book removal
issue, it chose to address that issue separately.248 The court ap-
peared to set up a stiff standard for student plaintiffs in book re-
moval cases by requiring allegations to the effect that the book was
made completely unavailable to the students, that the students
were prohibited from discussing the contents of the removed book,
or that the removal "was part of an action to cleanse the library of
materials conflicting with the School Board's orthodoxy."24 9 The
court concluded that the school board not only may, but should,
appraise the contents of books already selected in order to deter-
mine whether retaining them on library shelves was a warranted
use of limited shelf space.250 However, the board could not, ac-
cording to the court, remove a certain book "as part of a purge of
all material offensive to a single, exclusive perception of the way of
the world, anymore than [it] may originally stock the library on
that basis."251
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPROACHES TAKEN IN
LIBRARY CENSORSHIP CASES
A. The Preferable Approaches
After the Pico and Bicknell cases, the apparent rigidity of the
Presidents Council approach has softened. The Second Circuit no
longer sanctions unlimited power on the part of school boards to
remove books from libraries and curricula. Pico's recognition that
the impermissible suppression of ideas may well be at the heart of
a decision to remove a book252 is a realistic approach and, accord-
ingly, more desirable than Presidents Council's deference to the
school board's judgment, even where there may be serious ques-
tions concerning the board's motivation. But if the Pico suppres-
sion of ideas rationale is to be effective in vindicating the first
247. Id. at 1306.
248. Id. at 1308.
249. Id. See Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543-44 (10th Cir. 1979), in which
the court appeared to impose a similar test on teachers who sought to chal-
lenge book removals. Cary holding in favor of the board of education in a
book removal case in which teachers were the plaintiffs offers a good indica-
tion of the probable outcome in the Tenth Circuit of a case in which students
would be the plaintiffs.
250. 631 F.2d at 1308.
251. Id.
252. See notes 212-23 & accompanying text supra.
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amendment rights of students, courts should take a hard look at
any fact tending to show the board's attempt to suppress ideas
under the guise of a seemingly innocuous book removal. As Judge
Sifton pointed out in Pico, plaintiffs must be free to show that the
ostensible justifications offered by a school board for its removal of
a book "were simply pretexts" for impermissible suppression of
speech and ideas. 2
53
The Minarcini line of cases, based in part on the student's right
to receive information,254 and in part on the rationale that school
boards cannot remove books solely because their contents offend
the subjective tastes of the board members,255 is also preferable to
allowing school boards unfettered discretion regarding book re-
movals. The easily-offended board member who is capable of influ-
encing his fellow board members to agree that an offensive book
should be removed would be free to deprive students of the possi-
ble benefit to be gained from reading the book, unless a court inter-
vened to check the board's emotional or irrational decision. The
facts of the book removal cases make it clear that if works re-
garded in literary circles as valuable literature can be removed
from libraries because uninformed, impulsive board members call
the literature "garbage" or "filthy,"256 students are being deprived
of important educational opportunities. This is not to say that the
judiciary should constantly be looking over the shoulders of school
board members, most of whom undoubtedly act constitutionally
and in good faith. What is to be desired is that the courts look
closely at actions such as book removals which cannot readily be
explained by reasons neutral in first amendment terms. In this
way, the first amendment is not sacrificed in favor of platitudes
such as the trite statement that courts are reluctant to intervene in
the day-to-day operations of schools.257
Zykan is not entirely an anti-student rights case, despite its re-
sult. While the Seventh Circuit's requirements for a student plain-
tiffs constitutional claim in a book removal situation seem strict,258
the court indicated that school boards will not be permitted to pur-
sue a rigid orthodoxy in the procurement of instructional materials
nor allowed to present a one-sided view of the world.259
The approach the Supreme Court takes in Pico will, of course,
control the resolution of future book removal cases. For that rea-
253. 638 F.2d at 417.
254. See notes 158-64 & accompanying text supra. -
255. See notes 155, 170, 182 & accompanying text supra.
256. See, e.g., note 151 supra.
257. See notes 30-32 & accompanying text supra.
258. See note 249 & accompanying text supra.
259. 631 F.2d at 1306, 1308.
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son, it is to be hoped that the Court will not authorize a return to
the comfortable Presidents Council approach of mechanically de-
ferring to the wisdom of local school officials. While such an ap-
proach may relieve the courts of the burden of deciding some
difficult cases, it reflects a lack of sensitivity for students' rights.
The rationale employed in Pico, in the Minarcini line of cases, and,
to a lesser extent in Zykan, offers student plaintiffs the opportu-
nity to make a constitutional claim in a book removal situation.
Each of these three approaches is superior to that in the unen-
lightened Presidents Council decision. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court should not, in deciding Pico, effectively turn the clock back
to 1972, the year Presidents Council was decided.
While the Supreme Court now has an opportunity to clarify the
unsettled law in book removal litigation, it would have been prefer-
able if the Court had waited for a case with a trial record.26 0 Real-
istically, prospective plaintiffs in book removal litigation cannot
expect from a largely conservative Supreme Court language more
favorable than that in the Second Circuit's opinion in Pico. The
question left to be answered probably is not whether the Supreme
Court will expand the Second Circuit's approach, but rather
whether the Court will cut back on the potential scope of the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision, and if so, how much.
Two issues which have not been adequately discussed in the
book removal cases are: (1) whether different standards should
apply to the removal of an assigned or required book as opposed to
the removal of an optional library book, and (2) what impact the
book removal cases have with respect to a school board's failure to
initially select a given book.
The book removal cases have not differentiated between as-
signed and optional books. Instead, they have tended to lump the
two categories together for purposes of analyzing the constitu-
tional validity of the removal. A distinction between the two cate-
gories would seem, however, to have merit. In the case of an
assigned book, there is a captive audience problem because the
students are required to read the book. Therefore, it would not be
unreasonable to lessen the board's burden in justifying the re-
moval of assigned material and thus pay greater deference to the
board's decision. On the other hand, when an optional library
book is involved, no student is being forced to read the book. It
merely rests on the shelf, available to those who want to read it.
Since the captive audience interest is no longer present, the school
board should have a more substantial burden to carry in attempt-
ing to justify the removal of such a book.
260. See note 211 supra.
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The impact of the book removal decisions on initial book selec-
tion has been addressed sparingly in the book removal cases.
-While both Minarcini and Right to Read can be interpreted to indi-
cate that a board's failure to select a particular book cannot give
rise to a constitutional question,26 1 it is not clear why failure to se-
lect cases cannot be governed by the same criteria as removal
cases. The school board still should be required to exercise its dis-
cretion in selecting books within constitutional limitations.
The only practical difference between a removal case and a fail-
ure to select case would seem to be that a failure to select case
would be significantly more difficult to prove.2 62 This is true be-
cause an inference of impermissible motive can often be drawn
when a book is removed, while in a failure to select case, there may
be many permissible reasons why a book was not selected. Never-
theless, difficulty of proof is not a sufficient justification for refus-
ing to allow a prospective plaintiff to try to make out a claim.
One commentator has suggested that where a book of literary
merit is rejected by the board in its selection process, and the ap-
parent justification does not appear neutral but instead has "socio-
political overtones," the court should closely scrutinize the deci-
sion.263 However, if the refusal to select the book can reasonably
be explained by neutral, education-related reasons such as the dif-
ficulty level of the book, the board's decision should be
respected.264 The board should be obligated to create a balanced
presentation of ideas in its selection of instructional materials.
2 65
Where the plaintiff raises an inference that the board had an im-
permissible motive in refusing to approve a certain book, perhaps
by alleging facts tending to show that past book selections have
been one-sided, or that the board consciously disregarded recom-
mendations given to it by professional staff members, the plaintiff
should be held to have stated a prima facie case. The school board
should then be called upon to rebut the inference of impermissible
motive. Recognizing that student plaintiffs might, under the right
set of circumstances, state a cause of action for an unconstitutional
261. See Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 577 (6th Cir.
1976); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711
(D. Mass. 1978). In view of the courts' outspoken opposition to book remov-
als, it is somewhat surprising that they appeared to indicate that the book
selection process is outside constitutional scrutiny.
262. Note, supra note 16, at 1049.
263. Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Power of Boards to Select and Re-
move High School Text and Library Books, 52 ST. JoHN's L REV. 457, 482
(1978).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 476.
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failure to select certain books266 does not, of course, mean there
will be a flood of such cases. One would expect that only rarely
would such a case be brought, primarily because of the proof
difficulty.
One recent case where plaintiffs successfully sued based upon
an unconstitutional failure to select a book was Loewen v. Turnip-
seed.267 There the court held in favor of a group of plaintiffs, which
included students, 268 who alleged that the refusal of the defendant
state textbook committee to recommend and adopt a particular
history book for use in a required history course violated their first,
thirteenth, and fourteenth amendment rights.269 With respect to
the student claims, the court held that the state educational offi-
cials did not have unfettered authority to decide what children
may read in school, and that the officials' decisions had to be exer-
cised within the limits of the first amendment.270 Additionally, the
court held that the refusal to approve the book was based on a ra-
cially discriminatory purpose and evinced an intent to perpetuate
segregation and discrimination.271 It ordered that the book be ap-
proved and placed on the state list for purchase and distribution to
students.272
While Loewen included the racial discrimination factor in addi-
tion to the first amendment interests, the case nevertheless exem-
plifies a successful claim based on the failure to select a book. Of
course, if the Supreme Court's decision in Pico speaks disapprov-
ingly of book removal litigation, failure to select cases probably
will not be brought.
VII. CONCLUSION
Book removal cases present two competing interests, both of
which are significant: the traditional interest of local school offi-
cials in controlling public school operations with a relatively free
hand, and the countervailing student interest in receiving informa-
tion and being exposed to the total spectrum of ideas. Grave dan-
ger would be posed to students' rights if school officials' authority
to remove books were viewed as unfettered by first amendment
266. The Zykan court seemed to allude to such a possibility in its observation that
the school board cannot originally stock a library based on a one-sided exclu-
sive perspective of the world. 631 F.2d at 1308.
267. 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
268. Other plaintiffs were the students' parents, the authors of the textbook,
school districts, a school superintendent, and teachers. Id. at 1141.
269. Id. at 1142.
270. Id. at 1152-53.
271. Id. at 1154.
272. Id. at 1155.
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limitations. The Sixth Circuit, followed by two district courts in
the First Circuit and now, apparently, the Second Circuit, have
come to this conclusion and have taken steps to vindicate student
rights while still preserving ample school board authority over
book removals. Such steps are necessary to assure that students
will not become "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
state chooses to communicate."27 3 Now that such steps have been
taken, it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court, in deciding Pico,
does not retreat.
Arlen W. Langvardt '81
273. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
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